Barcelona vs AC Milan 4-0 (12/03/2013)

This time, I decided to observe a match in which Barcelona had a comfortable win.

Observations:

Busquets was placed higher up in this match, but was not man-marked - as a result, he took on the role of Xabi and Iniesta, providing passes to the forwards who were in dangerous position, allowing them to score. - giving space at all is not acceptable.

Dribbling - retaining the ball for too long in the midfield by dribbling is very risky - losing the ball even once opens up a lot of space, which Barcelona players will take advantage of without hesitation - retain ball with passing, and avoid dribbling if possible.

Zonal marking clearly did not work in this match - though man marking has the risk of players leaving space in some areas, AC Milan, in this match, gave the forwards too much freedom to roam.

Unlike the first leg, the covering play of AC Milan wasn't as good.
Also, David Villa playing higher up prevented the defenders from moving forward, giving Messi more space - a distraction for Mexes, who marked Messi in the first leg.

Real Madrid vs Barcelona 2-1 02-03-2013 LigaBBVA

Observations from this match:

Barcelona defense is concentration in the middle, or the center - this leaves the side flanks relatively vulnerable, which allowed Real Madrid to make crosses from both of the sides to create goal opportunities.

Real concede the goal when its final defense line was too high - this is risky against Barcelona because Messi is good at running into spaces, and is able to accelerate better than any defenders on the pitch.

Set pieces are effective against Barcelona - the average height of the players are relatively small - this allows direct free kick to have better chances of going over the wall and under the bar.
This also applies in indirect free kicks - Barcelona players have harder time winning the ball from the air - headers are a good tool against Barcelona, which Sergio Ramos was able to utilize in this match to score the winning goal.

AC Milan vs Barcelona 2-0 (2/20/13)

There are several observations to make in this match:

Initially, AC Milan made good use of long passes. Because high balls are more difficult to control compared to low balls, it leaves space for more competition, and chances for AC Milan players to win the ball in dangerous areas - and as a result, they have created more chances than Barcelona in this match.

Again, one of the goals came from a set piece - now, it can be decisively said that Barcelona is weak with set pieces.

Finally, AC Milan put very little space in between the final and the second defense line - this limited Barcelona's mid fielders - notably Xabi and Iniesta, freedom to create space and find the teammates with the ball. With Iniesta and Xabi effectively controlled with this tight spacing, Messi had no support, and could not even make one shot on target in this match.

Real Madrid vs Barcelona Copa del Rey Semifinal Second Leg

Barcelona collapsing due to Real's stable defense and ruthless breaks.

We can clearly see that Barcelona is most susceptible to breaks because its defense line is kept very high in order to contribute more to attacking. As a result, there is much space behind the defense line, which allows Real Madrid to use that space for its breaks.

Options

Last year, Pep Guardiola's alternative formation to the traditional 4-3-3 was a 3-4-3 formation. It was highly controversial, and the experiment has to be labelled a mixed affair. There were some good wins and thrilling attacking football, but equally there were disappointing losses and overrun defenses.

Now, Tito Vilanova is the manager and he has yet to play with a formation other than 4-3-3. But certainly, the option to play 4-2-3-1, one of the most popular formations in world football at the moment, seems more attractive than ever.

Credit must be given to Inder Methil, who a couple of months ago was one of the first to suggest the idea. You can read that first if you'd like, because I will try not to repeat much of what he has already said.

The biggest change since then is the signing of Alex Song, which gives the team license to play a much more conservative midfield three and the possibility of a double pivot. Another recent development which is quite interesting is the ability for Pedro Rodriguez to play in a central striking role, as he did recently for Spain, which only boosts the options Tito has at his disposal.

The Spanish national team won Euro 2012 with a formation that was broadly 4-3-2-1, and with so many players from that squad making up the Barcelona team, it makes it even more logical for Barcelona itself to try it out.

The age of the 3-4-3 started with a thrilling 5-0 win versus Villarreal, but the fissures started showing early. Against Valencia at Mestalla, Barca gave up two early goals and were looking totally bare down the right flank against Unai Emery's double fullback formation which had Jordi Alba and Jeremy Mathieu. .Still, in that same game Pep merely tweaked the 3-4-3 and the side came out and dominated the game, tied the score, and nearly took all 3 points.

Against Milan at home in the Champions League, an even more aggressive version of the 3-4-3 was used. It bordered on a 3-3-4, with both Lionel Messi and Cesc Fabregas attacking through the middle. It's defensive risks were exposed, as Milan scored, but the match was won 3-1 and progress into the semis.

Its two biggest failures came later, as the 3-4-3 lost to Real Madrid in the Camp Nou, essentially conceding La Liga, and it failed to win the tie versus Chelsea. However, the Chelsea match was also a mixed result: Barcelona clearly dominated and were winning 2-1 for much of the game. Barca had the game to win, but only razor-thin margins - a missed penalty, shots hitting the post, and a barely offside goal - kept the result. It was only due to away goals that the team had no one back defending in the last minute to prevent Fernando Torres from scoring an equalizer.

In the summer, many Cules watched closely as a good amount of Barcelona players were part of Vicente del Bosque's Euro 2012-winning squad. In the media, much was made about the supposed 4-6-0 formation that Don Vicente used. In reality, it was much closer to a 4-2-3-1.

Cesc, Andres Iniesta, and David Silva are all most naturally midfielders, but it's foolish to think they could not operate as forwards. Cesc in particular was very effective in leading the line for Spain - remember the opening goal in the final against Italy? He made a run any "true nine" would be proud of, receiving the ball in a very deep position and passing it into the center for Silva to put into the net.

The appeal of that Spain system is, obviously, that it won the big prize. More specifically, however, what is appealing is the brick wall it creates: Spain conceded one goal in the opening 61 minutes, and then none for the remaining 509 of the tournament.

How did they manage to concede only 0.17 goals per game while Barca gave up 0.75 this past season? OK, Iker Casillas is a better keeper than Victor Valdes but that does not explain it fully. Dani Alves is better than Alvaro Arbeloa, too, but that doesn't make a difference of that magnitude.

The truth is Spain played much more conservatively, because they scored 2 goals per game while Barcelona very nearly scored 3 per game. There are other reasons of course, but that one sticks out. So while it's not a better option it does have one great advantage in knockout football. If you don't concede, the worst that can happen is you'll go to a penalty shootout. In the league, if you don't concede you can still drop points.

For that reason, the 4-2-3-1 is most attractive for Barcelona to use in matches where it does not necessarily have to score, like when they are holding a lead.

This is one way Barcelona could line up in the 4-2-3-1:

With the signing of Song, Barcelona have another option in who to play in a midfield two. Song and Sergio Busquets are both capable defenders and good passers, which is a requirement of a a midfield duo in a 4-2-3-1. In a central striking role, Cesc can reprise his role from the Euros. but it could also be David Villa, Alexis Sanchez, or even Pedro, who played that role for Spain in their last friendly.

Iniesta would have to then take up the left wing spot to accommodate Messi "in the hole" behind the striker. Arguably not Andres's best position, but it only contributes to the security in possession this lineup gives.

This XI would help keep more clean sheets, and we would hope that players like Messi can make up for the drop off in attacking bent of the system. In addition, if the desire is to buy a Llorente or Falcao-type striker, it would be good to see if we have a good solution "in house" first, or, at the very least, if that formation would be functional.

Remember that "parked buses" are not really our biggest threat. It's a team that can both defend AND pick its spots to attack. The best parked bus jobs in history - Inter Milan and Chelsea in Champions League semifinals - still did not beat us on the game. Inter lost the match and needed a Bojan goal to be questionably disallowed to progress. Chelsea relied on a 1-0 win at home, a missed penalty, and the away goals rule to win the tie. The point is the biggest threat is actually a team that can both score and keep us at bay.

The 4-2-3-1 could be useful in tough away trips and to defend leads at home.

Source: http://www.barcablaugranes.com/2012/9/9/3305462/is-the-3-4-3-leaving-barcelona-and-tito-vilanovas-plan-b-a-4-2-3-1

Video

Match Analysis

Barcelona 2-2 Real Madrid: two goals each for Ronaldo and Messi

The starting line-ups

Both sides appeared content with a point from an entertaining match.

Tito Vilanova surprisingly named Adriano at centre-back rather than Alex Song, in the absence of Gerard Pique and Carles Puyol. Andres Iniesta returned to the side in place of Alexis Sanchez.

Jose Mourinho went for a familiar side – with no Luka Modric or Michael Essien, it was essentially the Real of last season, with Mesut Ozil as the number ten.

It was the usual pattern – Barca dominating possession, Real a threat from quicker attacks and set-pieces.

Formations

This was a simpler tactical battle than recent Clasicos. There was no hint of Barcelona playing three at the back, as they did frequently under Guardiola in these matches, despite injury problems at the back. It was a clear back four, with Busquets staying in midfield rather than dropping between the centre-backs.

There was a modification to Barca’s 4-3-3 on the left, however.Against Benfica in midweek that was the zone they looked to play in, but with Iniesta rather than Sanchez they played in a different fashion. Iniesta played in an odd role – either a deep and central left-winger, or a high and wide central midfielder. He concentrated on dragging Alvaro Arbeloa out of position. Cesc Fabregas played a free, varied attacking midfield role – trying to find space between the lines and breaking forward into attack.

Real were a simple 4-2-3-1, and while they’ve often looked more like 4-4-1-1 or 4-5-1 without the ball in this fixture under Mourinho, tonight they made more of an effort to retain their shape. Cristiano Ronaldo and Mesut Ozil stayed high up the pitch while Angel Di Maria was dragged deeper, but obvious battles were apparent across the pitch in  an open encounter, with both sides having a spare man at the back. Xabi Alonso moved higher up the pitch than usual, trying to press Xavi Hernandez – although the Barcelona captain remained in a deep position close to Sergio Busquets, so Alonso gradually stood off.

Barcelona approach

The game was not so much about the midfield battle, which Barcelona were always likely to dominate by virtue of having extra numbers, but about what the teams were attempting in the final third. Barcelona’s initial attacking threat was minimal – despite plenty of the ball they failed to offer penetration, partly because of the lack of forward running. Lionel Messi came towards the ball, often tracked by Sergio Ramos, but Pedro Rodriguez was the only man making runs in behind the defence – Fabregas was bursting from a deeper, more obvious position, while Iniesta drifted infield rather than towards goal. Barcelona played in front of Real, which meant the away side were happy to keep a high line and remain compact.

Iniesta’s unusual positioning was a key factor in Barcelona’s moves. Alvaro Arbeloa tried to stick very tight to him – often tracking him well into central midfield zones – which meant space opened up for Jordi Alba to break into. As against Benfica, he was more attacking than Barcelona’s right-back (Martin Montoya replaced Daniel Alves because of injury midway through the first half) and overlapped well. It felt as if Barcelona could have made more of Arbeloa’s aggressive positioning if Fabregas had moved more towards that side, but he remained central.

Pedro was high up on the right, offering width and tricky wing play. With Messi quiet in the opening minutes, Pedro seemed the major threat, although it took involvement from Iniesta for him to contribute to a goal. Iniesta drifted across to the right to take up a similar position to the ones he was taking up on the left – this dragged Marcelo narrow and opened up space for Pedro to cross.

Real Madrid approach

Real carried out their gameplan more effectively than Barcelona in the first half. First, there was the shape without the ball – which was positive and high up the pitch. As the game went on it became more scrappy, but in the opening minutes Real won the ball cleanly and launched quick attacks. Alonso hit a couple of diagonals into wide positions, and the role of Mesut Ozil was important – although his contribution on the ball in the first half was minimal, his movement into wide zones helped overload Barcelona in the full-back positions, and Real could get crosses into the box.

Ozil’s positioning on the right played a part in Real’s opener, when they worked the ball across the pitch for Ronaldo to score. Interestingly, it was the third time Real had looked threatening in the zone outside Alves – first Marcelo moved there untracked but didn’t receive a pass, then Karim Benzema had drifted to the back post for a cross he didn’t connect with cleanly. Barcelona were less vulnerable in that zone once Montoya replaced Alves.

Benzema’s finishing was poor, but his hold-up play was impressive and he helped encourage his teammates up the pitch – although Real often played directly, they also got numbers into the final third and put pressure on Barcelona. Set-pieces were an obvious danger for the home side, whose average height was even smaller than usual – Ramos headed wide from one corner.

Second half

There was little progression in the tactical battle in the second half. Messi was more involved, and Fabregas seemed to stay wider to the left, trying to take advantage of the space in behind Arbeloa. The first tactical change was Vilanova removing Fabregas and introducing Sanchez, who mastered the out-to-in run from the left on Tuesday night, although wasn’t involved much here.

Ozil became more of a presence in the second half, drifting wide, prompting counter-attacks and also assisting Ronaldo’s goal. The German’s influence upon games at the Nou Camp is often questioned, but that’s two consecutive Liga fixtures at this stadium where he’s assisted a Ronaldo goal, and his overall contribution was good.

Barcelona had a lot of the ball in the final 20 minutes but didn’t create significant clear-cut chances when Real had men behind the ball. Their most presentable chance was when Pedro broke quickly down the right in behind the defence, and they went closest when Montoya hit the bar from long range.

The significant Real changes were like-for-like – Gonzalo Higuain for Benzema, Kaka for Ozil. Vilanova didn’t elect to use his third substitution, while Mourinho used Michael Essien for Angel Di Maria in the 88th minute, seemingly pushing Kaka right and going for a 4-5-1 system. He was happy with a point.

Conclusion

Not an overly tactical match – both sides played their usual system, with a minor caveat on the left side of Barcelona’s attack (although that was fairly standard in big games under Guardiola when he used Iniesta wide in the front three). Couple that with the lack of significant tactical shifts or substitutions, and this was basically two sides playing their own game rather than thinking about the opposition.

The game was played a decent standard, yet there were only five shots on target – and four goals. This fixture is often cast as Messi versus Ronaldo, ignoring their talented teammates and the overall tactical contest, but if there has ever been a Clasico that was primarily about the goalscoring of those two players, this was it.

Source: http://www.zonalmarking.net/2012/10/07/barcelona-2-2-real-madrid-two-goals-each-for-ronaldo-and-messi/